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Abstract- A relatively peaceful and harmonious 
relationship between Muslims and Christians in 
Indonesia has been dotted by religious 
intolerance and worship restrictions in the form 
of churches destruction, banned and closed. The 
majority of restrictions happened in West Java 
Province, mostly in Bandung, Bekasi and Bogor 
regions where this research use them as a case 
study. Ironically, the majority of restriction 
occurred in the Reformasi era, where the 
political system should have promoted human 
rights and practices of the decentralized system. 
Against this background, this thesis seeks to find 
out the cases of worship restriction in reform era 
and how a democratic government deals with 
such restriction. To answer the questions, this 
research utilizes qualitative methodology 
particularly the case studies, to ensure the 
comprehensiveness of its data sources and 
analyzes. By employing theories of democracy 
and democratization, decentralization, and 
human rights, this study finds that Muslims- 
Christians relationship since the beginning of 
their encounter in Indonesia has been spoiled by 
reciprocal threat perception regarding the 
suspicion of Christianization vis a vis the 
suspicion of the establishment of the Islamic 
state. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
An ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle 
(350 BC), had put an important foundation of 
democracy when he said that democracy 
coexists with the enactment of liberty and 
equality, which then becomes the central 
element of human rights. The conception of 
democracy keeps developing, and now many 
countries in the world claim themselves to 
become democratic states. Influenced by 
western political scientists [1], state leaders 
believe that democratic political system is an 
essential basis for the enforcement, promotion 
and protection of human rights, including the 
religious freedom and right to exercise its 
worships. Nonetheless, this article performs 
that the changing of the political system in 
Indonesia towards more democratic worsened 
the Muslims-Christians relationship as it 
resulted in significant numbers of worship 
restriction in several areas of Indonesia, 
particularly in West Java province. 
It is true that international community 
and national authorities in Indonesia have 
placed a comprehensive and legal basis for 
human rights promotion and protection 
including for the religious freedom. As 
reported by some non-government 
organizations, both local and international, the 
implementation remains problematic. 
Apparently, there is a gap between the policy 
made by central governments and its 
implementation by local governments. This 
article therefore deeply elaborates the issue of 
the antagonistic relationship between the 
majority Muslims and minority Christians in 
Indonesia, which is endorsed by the local 
government and followed by worship 
restrictions in the era of democracy. 
Interestingly, worship restrictions in 
Indonesia come together with the democratic 
transition in the country. The political system 
changing from an authoritarian into a more 
democratic state in the late 1990s has raised 
hopes to its people that they would have 
enjoyed a greater human rights promotion and 
protection, including the freedom of thought, 
union, speech, religion and its practices of 
worship. This study finds that a democratic 
system in Indonesia worsened the Muslim- 
Christian relationship and resulted in religious 
intolerance and worship  restriction  in 
particular areas such as Bandung, Bekasi and 
Bogor, which are endorsed by the local 
government. 
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Using the qualitative research design, 
particularly the case study, this article 
emphasizes the importance of social and 
political context for understanding the current 
phenomenon and encourages the researcher to 
have close involvement in social and/or 
political fields to gain information and 
important data [2]. This study uses both 
primary and secondary data to support its 
analysis. They are collected from interviews 
with religious leaders and government officers 
as well as from various literature, reports 
documents, and database collected by other 
scholars and/or researchers, such as 
Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (PGI), 
Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta (FKKJ), 
Wahid Institute (WI) and Setara Institute (SI). 
This article will be organized in five sub- 
chapters, started by the background and 
followed by the historical description of the 
dynamic relationships between Indonesian 
Muslims and Christians. Afterwards this article 
will elaborate how a democratic transition 
worsened Muslims-Christians relationship and 
contributed to worship restrictions by looking 
at cases in Bandung, Bekasi and Bogor, and 
eventually, this article will be concluded by 
recommendations. 
 
II. THE DYNAMIC OF MUSLIM- 
CHRISTIAN RELATIONSHIPS IN 
INDONESIA 
Christianity entered Indonesia brought by 
Germany, Portuguese and Dutch missionaries 
when Islam reached its peak in most of 
Indonesia in the 16th century. The evangelism 
practised by Western missionaries was difficult 
to   apply   to   the   local   Muslims   people, 
Similarly, the Indonesian Muslims are not one 
united actor as they follow very  diverse 
streams embracing from traditional, modern, 
puritan, extreme, fundamentalist and radical. 
The majority of them, if not all, follow Sunni, 
and most of them join Nahdlatul Ulema (NU) 
as well as Muhammadiyah, the biggest Islamic 
Organizations in Indonesia which claim to 
have more than 40 million and 30 millions 
members respectively. 
Although Muslims and Christians first 
encounter was sensitively marked with 
rejection and negative perception, the feelings 
of nationalism and the desire to expel Dutch 
colonialists as their common enemy eventually 
united them. In the second Youth Congress, 
27-28 October 1928, youths from Java, 
Sumatera, Betawi (Jakarta), and Celebes or 
Sulawesi, who are Muslims, and Christian 
youths from North Sumatera, Ambon, and 
Chinese descendants, came together and 
declared themselves as one nation, regardless 
their religions. This Muslims-Christians 
relationship was considered positive until 
Indonesia gained its independence in August 
1945. 
Couple months before the Indonesian 
Independence Declaration, there was a debate 
between nationalist groups and religious 
groups, mostly from Islamic groups, regarding 
the form of the state and the ideology that the 
country would use. Religious groups from 
Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, Partai Syarikat 
Islam Indonesia, and Islamic Party called 
PERTI, insisted on establishing an Islamic 
State, as they believed that most of the 
Indonesian people embraced Islam as their 
religion. Yet leaders from nationalists, such as 1 
particularly in Java and Sumatra, rejected the Soekarno And  Hatta  prevailed  to  convince 
new religion. They often described Christian 
missionaries and their followers as infidels or 
devils and the religion is always associated 
with the colonialists and perceived as “a 
religion of the colonialists” [3]. This situation 
caused Christianization only succeeded in 
North Sumatera and Eastern part of Indonesia 
such as East Nusa Tenggara, Ambon, Manado 
and Papua, who remained practised the local 
beliefs as well as animism and dynamism [4]. 
One thing that we need to note that 
evangelists from different countries conveyed 
different teachings and practices of 
Christianity in Indonesia [5], as there are 
Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, 
Mennonite, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostalism 
and Charismatic denominations spread and 
then developed all over Indonesia. Such 
divergent accordingly explains the logics 
behind the establishment of a great number of 
churches   within   the   Christian   community. 
them to establish the state of Indonesia in a 
secular form of Republic concerning all 
religions with the consideration of the diversity 
of ethnics, religions and races in Indonesia. 
They eventually agreed to establish a state with 
Republic system and accepted Pancasila as the 
ideology instead of Islamic laws [6]. 
This positive relationship between 
Muslims and Christians relatively lasted until 
the end of New Order Era under Soeharto’s 
regime. According to Mujiburrahman [7], 
Soeharto successfully increased the economic 
welfare and the national security with a strong 
military power, which was used to against any 
domestic disturbances including that came 
from religious groups. With his ability to 
stabilize  the  national  situation  as  well  as 
 
 
1 Sukarno expressed his political view about the form of the 
newborn state, Indonesia, in Public Lecture in University of 
Indonesia, 7 May 1953, titled, “Negara Nasional dan Cita-Cita 
Islam.” 
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regional security, there was no significant 
tension between Muslims and Christians. The 
increasing numbers of Christian followers have 
provoked suspicious from Muslims towards 
Christianization programs conducted by 
missionary organizations in  Indonesia  and 
from abroad. This situation then developed 
into a tension between Muslims and Christians 
during New Order Era [8]. 
The tension deteriorated at the end of 
Soeharto’s regime and when political system 
in Indonesia finally changed into a more 
democratic regime in mid-1998. Started with a 
church destruction in Gereja Misi Injili in 
Pontianak in March 1996 and then followed by 
Situbondo cases, in which more than 15 
churches were destroyed in the same time, the 
situation between Muslims and Christians got 
worsened. There were altogether 145 churches 
had been destructed and burnt only in 2 years, 
(1996-May 1998) [9]. The tension apparently 
came from both groups, resulted from their 
movements and activities. 
On the one hand, Suharto points out the 
aggressive Christianity missionary activities 
using churches for converting massive 
Muslims to Christians as a trigger to their 
tension [10]. The missionary program usually 
comes in the form of giving basic needs, 
sponsorship for education and free medical 
treatments for the needy people. The 
missionary activities are allegedly  supported 
by the rising of Pentecostalism and 
Charismatic (Neo-Pentecostalism) Christian 
movements in Indonesia, brought by the US 
missionaries in the late 1970s [11]. They 
delivered their teachings using advance 
methods, such as making revival services and 
healing ministry2 Withdrawing a lot of people 
to join the ministry. 
As a result of Christianity missionary, the 
number of Christian adherents has grown and 
become the religion with a second largest 
number of followers in Indonesia, after Islam. 
In 2010, the Central Bureau of statistic (BPS) 
as cited in 2015 Annual Report of Indonesian 
Ministry of Religion Affairs, records that Islam 
 
 
2 Revival services and healing ministry are usually conducted 
by the denomination of Pentecostal and Charismatic 
Churches in a broad place, such as in convention halls, hotels 
or at open space, with massive numbers of people involved 
and well-prepared program. The organizers sometimes also 
publish the revival services information through radio, TV, 
banners and flyers to invite a lot of people who are in faith 
degradation, experience severe sickness and/or other bad 
situation to come and to have a revival in their life or to be 
healed from their sickness. This method can be  very 
attractive to bring a lot of people, mostly Christians and other 
religion adherents, to come and to experience what  they 
claim as a revival and healing movement. At the end of the 
service, the priests usually invite those who are not believers 
yet to come and to be prayed so they can accept Christianity 
as their religion. 
adhered by the majority of Indonesia people, 
numbers to 207.176.162 or 87,21% of the total 
population,  followed  by  Protestant  that  has 
16.528.513 people or 6,96%; Roman Catholic 
with 6.907.873 adherents or 2,91%; Hinduism 
with  4.012.116  or  1,69%;  Buddhism  shares 
1.703.254 people or 0,72% and Confucianism 
with 117.091 followers or 0,05%. Other beliefs 
have 299.617 followers or 0,5%. 
Although Christianity (Protestant and 
Catholic) ranks second largest population in 
Indonesia, according to National Census by 
Central Statistic Agency in 2010, the number 
of its followers significantly grows from 2.8% 
in  1933  to  7.39%  in  1971,  8.83%  in  1980, 
9.6% in 1990, and 9.87%. The increasing 
number of Christians is accordingly followed 
by a rapid growth of its worship places. This is 
not to mention the dissension of churches 
denomination influencing their followers to 
establish their churches based on 
denominations. The prohibition from the 
leaders of certain churches to their 
congregations to join churches other than their 
denominations, which they claim to have 
different teachings and doctrines, provokes the 
establishment of many new churches based on 
denominations. 
The increasing numbers of Christian 
followers and the obscurity numbers of 
Christians' worship places to a greater extent 
raise concern and are perceived threat by some 
Muslims. They have been critical of so-called 
Christianization program conducted by the 
churches and missionary organizations from 
Indonesia and abroad [12]. Such 
Christianization program provokes insecurity 
feeling of the hardline groups, and they react 
accordingly to what they considered as 
Christian provocation. They perceive that they 
need to defend their faith and reject any efforts 
to convert their Muslim friends, including 
through the services that are conducted at a 
Christian's home covered by birthday 
celebration [13]. 
On the other hand, Solahudin focuses on 
the rise of political Islam that initially 
happened in Iran, which then provoked Islamic 
group in Indonesia to conduct similar ways to 
topple Soeharto’s regime. This situation 
created fear towards Christians, as they 
perceived the Muslims were establishing an 
Islamic State in Indonesia and this would harm 
their life and interests in Indonesia. Over the 
years Christians perceive that radical Muslims 
have been devoting their efforts to establish an 
Islamic State in Indonesia, which is rooted in 
the establishment of Darul Islam in 1948 [14]. 
The history of Islamic State started when 
Kartosuwirjo  had  a  disappointment  with  the 
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legal government under Soekarno and 
perceived that nationalist party could not fulfil 
the aspiration of majority Muslims in 
Indonesia. His mission was then to establish an 
Islamic State supported by Daud Beureuh in 
Aceh and Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi. 
Kartosuwirjo’s Islamic State covered West 
Java, Central Java, partly of Aceh and South 
Sulawesi. Although this movement was 
eventually defeated in 1962, the ideology of 
Islamic State remains embraced by 
Kartosuwirjo’s followers and their descendants 
up to now. The activities of Jemaah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (JII) from the 1990s to mid-2000s to 
stifle the legal government and attack other 
religious communities, which are then 
followed by its affiliations  currently, 
performed the aspirations of such ideology 
[15]. 
 
III. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND 
WORSHIP RESTRICTION 
Democratic transition in Indonesia, which 
should have promoted peaceful and freedom, 
has apparently been spotted by violence 
amongst and within internal religious 
followers, coupled with religious intolerance. 
Report of National Commission of Human 
Rights (Komnas HAM) in 2015 records that 
the abuse against the right of religious freedom 
and faith practices numbered to 95, in which 
61 incidences or about 60% took the forms of 
banning, blocking, destroying worship places 
and stopping religious activities. Such 
restrictions not only targeted at Christian 
communities but also to other minority Muslim 
communities such as Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite 
and the community of other religious 
adherents. This fact proves that even until 
2015, the rights to practice religious belief and 
faith in Indonesia has yet guaranteed, 
regardless of constitutional mandate, and 
worship restrictions remain to exist [16]. 
The process of democratization in 
Indonesia, which has developed since 1998, 
brings two major changes including the 
promotion of freedom regarding union, 
expression and religion as well as changing 
from the centralistic types of government to 
the decentralization or regional autonomy. 
First, with regards to the freedom of speech, 
expression and union, Indonesian people may 
perceive it as a stimulation to establish non- 
governmental organizations to perform a 
significant role of civil society in democratic 
states. The establishment of civil societies, on 
the one hand, contributes positively to the 
democratic political system of Indonesia. But, 
on the other hand, it leaves a bulk of problems 
at  the  social,  political  and  cultural  spheres, 
including the inter-faiths relationship. As 
confirmed by Bahtiar Effendy, rather than 
responding to the Indonesian democratic 
transition, some social and political 
movements emerged as instruments to actively 
express and uphold radical ideology using the 
religious symbol. This accordingly creates 
religious intolerance perpetrated by some 
militant and/or hardline groups towards other 
religious groups [17]. 
Secondly, the central mission of the 
political transformation in Indonesia is 
delegating government affairs more to local 
government, while certain government 
functions such as fiscal and monetary, foreign 
affairs, judicial security, defence and religion 
remain the authority of central government. 
Decentralization is vital in democratic system. 
In the 6th  Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government organized by South Korea and the 
United Nations on 27 May 2005 state leaders 
agreed on “Seoul Declaration on Participatory 
and Transparent Governance” which 
confirmed that “good governance requires an 
appropriate level of decentralization, 
innovation and development of local 
government.” Such system makes local 
administration works more effectively. 
Although religion is part of central 
government’s functions, in managing the 
establishment of worship places as part of 
religious affairs in Indonesia, the central 
government represented by Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Ministry of Home 
Affairs issued joint decree called Peraturan 
Bersama Menteri (PBM) No. 8 and 9 in 2006. 
The core of this decree is delegating the 
authority of the establishment of worship 
places to the local/regional leader to ensure the 
order and the smoothness of the religious and 
belief practices. However, the implementation 
of this joint decree (PBM) has created at least 
four critical issues. First, PBM/2006 puts an 
uneven considering on the role of the head of 
local government in promoting the religious 
and worship freedom. As the principle of the 
establishment of worship, places are now seen 
more from the perspective of order and 
security, not from the perspective of promoting 
religious freedom as one of the fundamental 
human rights. 
Secondly, PBM No. 8 and 9/2006 is in 
some ways are believed to limit religious 
freedom more than promote or protect it. It 
requires the signatories from 90 users and 
consent from 60 members of the community 
surrounding the location (article 14). Thirdly, 
PBM No. 8 and 9/2006, which initially aimed 
at reducing discrimination, in its 
implementation  creates  otherwise.  Formerly 
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the establishment of worship places needs no 
special permit. It required a regular permit just 
like the one in the establishment of a regular 
building which needed no 60 consent 
signatures of people living surroundings. The 
role of the government was simply to check 
the feasibility, the ownership and the security 
of the building. The enactment of PBM/2006 
inspires people whether to agree or disagree 
with the establishment of the church and might 
provoke reciprocal protests. Human Right 
Watch (HRW) confirms that PBM/2006 
created “unnecessary restriction“ for building 
worship places [18]. And fourthly, the 
PBM/2006 fails to solve the problem of 
worship restrictions at the grass-roots level. 
Difficulties in obtaining the permit for the 
establishment of worship places resume the 
target of violence and intimidation. 
With regards to worship restriction, the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 
published in the 105th US Congress and the 
UN Resolution No A/RES/51/93 regarding 
Elimination of all Forms of Religious 
Intolerance (Art. 4), has explained the 
terminology from the behavior, activities and 
perpetrators. This article mainly uses the 
definition by looking at two dimensions; first 
is the policies and activities that launched and 
committed by the government which restrict 
and prohibit certain religious groups to 
conduct their worship activities, and second is 
all efforts and intolerant acts perpetrated by 
radical groups to stop minority religious 
groups’ worship activities, such as threatening, 
intimidating, destroying, burning, stoning and 
exploding their worship places that is allowed, 
tolerated and/or supported by the local 
government and security apparatus. The 
supports from local government can be seen 
through policies launched and/or activities to 
let the violence happened as well as to support 
the restriction against Christians’ activities and 
worship after they received the report or 
protest from mass and/or hardline groups. 
As far as religious intolerance 
materialized in church restrictions is 
concerned, data collected from Persekutuan 
Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (PGI) or the 
Council of Churches in Indonesia, Forum 
Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta (FKKJ), Wahid 
Institute (WI) and Setara Institute (SI) 
discloses that during Indonesian Reform Era, 
from June 1998 to Dec 2015, worship 
restrictions across areas in Indonesia in terms 
of church destruction, closing, and worship 
banning have been experienced by at least 643 
churches from various denominations. This 
numbers excluded the worship places 
destruction in Poso, Palu and Maluku during 
socio-religious conflicts from late 1990s to 
mid 2000 in which 192 churches and 28 
mosques were destroyed and burnt, as well as 
the incidences of terrorist attack such as the 
Christmas’ eve bombing in 2000 in which 24 
churches were exploded [19]. 
From a statistical point of view, 
Indonesian Christians suffered 35,6 worship 
and churches restriction each year from 1998 
to 2015. The following graphic shows that 
majority restrictions took place in 1998 with 
81 churches were restricted. It is then 
consecutively followed in 2011 with 78 
churches, 2010 with 65 churches, 2002 with 52 
churches, 2004 and 2013 with 51 churches 
each, 2012 with 47 churches, 2005 with 39 
churches, 1999 and 2001 with 31 churches 
each, and 2007 with 22 churches. Worship 
restrictions took place less than 20 in 2002, 
2003, 2006, 2008 and 2009 with 10, 9, 17, 14, 
and 15 churches each. Seen from the periodical 
sequence, Church restrictions  in  Indonesia 
took into two forms; the first type of restriction 
targeted to the established churches, the second 
one is targeted to the churches before their 
establishment [20]. 
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FIGURE 1. CHURCH RESTRICTIONS IN 
INDONESIA FROM JUNE 1998 TO DEC 
2015 
Source: Reports from PGI, FKKJ, SI, and WI 
churches, West Nusa Tenggara province with 
29 churches, South Sulawesi province with 23 
churches, Yogyakarta with 20 churches, North 
Sumatera and Riau provinces with 13 churches 
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During Old Order era (August 1945- 
March 1967) under President Soekarno, for 
about 22 years only two churches that were 
attacked, and no churches were threatened or 
banned. The number of worship restrictions 
increased during New Order era (April 1967- 
May 1998) under President Soeharto, for about 
32 years 444 churches were attacked, two 
churches were threatened, and only ten 
churches were banned. Of the incidences, 145 
churches were attacked, or 33% of incidences 
occurred in the last two years of Soeharto’s 
regime (1996-May 1998). The number of 
worship restrictions significantly increased in 
Reform Era (June 1998-Dec 2015). As 643 
churches have been restricted in 17 years, with 
238 churches were attacked, destroyed, stoned 
or exploded, 111 churches were 
threatened/rejected, 53 churches were sealed, 
and 241 churches were closed or banned [21]. 
The above-mentioned  worship 
restrictions have taken place in 20 out of 34 
provincial areas throughout Indonesia, with 
105 district areas (Kabupaten) and City areas 
(Kota). Majority incidences took place in West 
Java with 270 churches were restricted, where 
Bekasi experienced majority cases with 89 
churches were restricted, Bandung with 81 
churches and Bogor with 18 churches. It  is 
then followed consecutively by Central Java 
province with 63 churches were restricted, 
DKI Jakarta province with 57 churches, Aceh 
province with 46 churches, Banten province 
with 43 churches, East Java province with 36 
 
 
each, Central Sulawesi province with 10 
churches, Bengkulu and Lampung provinces 
with 4 churches each, South Kalimantan 
provinces with 3 churches, East Kalimantan, 
Jambi, South Sumatera and Maluku provinces 
with 2 churches each, and West Sumatera 
province with 1 church each. 
IV. WORSHIP RESTRICTION IN 
BANDUNG, BEKASI AND BOGOR 
At the surface, religious tolerance in Bandung 
seems fine. The moderate Muslim 
organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Christian Community sometimes hold forums 
to maintain tolerance. In such meetings, they 
sought to reach a mutual understanding or 
consensus for common interest. The majority 
of Bandung government officers feel that 
religious tolerance within Muslims community 
and between Muslims and non-Muslims' life in 
Bandung runs well. Bandung people who are 
educated are quite supportive of such tolerant 
life [22]. Nonetheless, beneath, the negative 
perception, attitude and behavior between 
Muslim and Christian communities, which 
lead to violence and religious intolerance, 
remain existed. 
In a more detail explanation, 73% of 81 
worship restriction incidences in Bandung 
occurred in the form of fiercely closing the 
worship places, which are most likely due to 
misuse of residents and/or office building and 
no permits. 16% of the restrictions manifested 
in the forms of threat or intimidation such as 
rejection from residents, 7% of the incidents 
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are in the form of attacking, destroying, 
burning, or exploding the worship places, and 
4% is in the form of sealing. 38% of the 
worship restriction targeted to residential 
houses, which have been used for worship 
places and more than 50% restrictions took the 
terms of closing and sealing the churches 
which they consider ”illegal” or have no 
permit from local government and banning the 
worship done in such churches [23]. 
There are multi causes explaining such 
restrictions. The first and foremost is the 
difficulties and the failure in obtaining a permit 
for building the church. It, therefore, makes 
sense that the majority of restriction actors in 
Bandung involved local government apparatus, 
as their restriction action is the implementation 
of law enforcement against the church 
constructions, which obtained no permit. In 
some incidences, local government apparatus 
is represented by the head of sub-district, head 
of the village and local police units for order 
and security or also known as Satpol PP. 
Interestingly, in doing such worship restriction, 
local government officers received support 
from local mass and hardline groups such as 
Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Alliance of Anti- 
Apostate Movements or Aliansi Gerakan Anti 
Pemurtadan (AGAP), and Islamic Reformist 
Movement or Gerakan Islam Reformis 
(GARIS) [24]. Out of 81 church restrictions in 
Bandung, 54 cases caused by local 
government’s action such as reluctant  of 
giving letter of permit and their instruction to 
close or ban churches with or without support 
from local people and hardline groups, 28 
restrictions were supported by local Muslim 
mass and residents, and 25 restrictions were 
supported by militant/hardline groups, 
including FPI, AGAP, and GARIS. 
Similarly, Bekasi experienced 89 
incidences of worship restrictions during 1998- 
2015. Different from incidences in Bandung, 
28 incidences in Bekasi took the term of 
church closing and or banning. The number of 
violent incidences in term of church attacks, 
destroy and destruction are quiet significant 
with 16 incidences, compared to those of 
Bandung, which only occurred six times. 
Intimidation and threats by local people and 
radical mass were experienced by 31 churches, 
and church sealed committed to at least 14 
churches. Cases in Bekasi show striking 
figures on the involvement of radical groups 
include Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Forum 
Majelis Peduli Umat (FMPU), Forum Umat 
Islam, Bekasi (FUI), Forum Islam Bersatu 
(FIB) and Forum Anti Pemurtadan (FAP). The 
figure is similar to that of Bandung where 
radical   mass   was   involved   in   29   of   89 
incidences, while the local government 
represented by Bekasi city mayor, Satpol PP, 
local police, head of sub-district and head of 
sub-neighbourhood were behind 30 incidences. 
The rest, 41 incidences involved ordinary 
Muslims, but received support from FPI and 
FUI. 
A striking example of this is the case of 
HKBP Filadelfia. The church management 
successfully collected 259 signatures of 
agreement from people living in the 
surrounding locations. The number of 
signatures is even more than that required by 
PBM 2006 (60 signatures). Unfortunately, the 
HKBP did not even receive consent from the 
local ministry of religious affairs and the Inter- 
religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). The 
HKBP Filadelfia then appealed the case. The 
Provincial State Administration Court (PTUN) 
in Bandung and the Supreme Court in Jakarta 
won the case. Controversially the Bekasi 
District Head (Bupati) at that time, Saadudin, 
persisted in rejecting to issue the construction 
permit of HKBP church [25]. 
Even when the Supreme Court verdict 
had won HKBP Filadelphia appeal, the local 
government persisted that the verdict could not 
be executed due to threat of conflicts with the 
protesters. The case proved that the local 
government failed to obey the central 
government's decision as well as to provide 
protection and to promote order in  local 
society. The protester groups supported by the 
government offered the HKBP Filadelphia for 
relocation [26]. Until 2012, Filadelphia could 
not worship at their church building. Hardline 
groups blocked Filadelphia members to enter 
the church building and made them worship in 
the parking location of the church [27]. 
A different case applies in the case of 
Santa Clara Catholic Church and HKBP 
Manseng in North Bekasi. Although these two 
churches have got a letter of permission since 
2015 and the major of Bekasi City, Rahmat 
Effendi has justified the construction of these 
two churches, the residents supported by 
Islamic movements such as Forum  Umat 
Islam, Bekasi and Forum Anti Pemurtadan 
(Anti Apostate Forum), remained rejected the 
constructions. Even, when the hardliners 
forced the local leaders to stop the worship 
activities conducted by these two churches, 
Bekasi City major insisted on allowing both 
churches to commit their services. Effendi's 
persistence on this issue has provoked a 
contention between the local leaders  and 
radical groups in Bekasi. Yet, it brought him to 
gain an award from National Commissioner on 
Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 2016 [28]. 
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In Bogor, 11 of the 18 church restrictions 
are closed/banned due to the failure of getting 
building construction permit (IMB), four of 
which were closed/banned due to misuse of the 
home store as a church, 6 others were attacked 
or destroyed, and another church was rejected 
and intimidated by residents. Thirteen 
incidences of worship restriction in Bogor 
were conducted by ordinary mass Muslims 
and/or local residents, 10 of which are 
supported by local leaders and local 
government. Again the issue of the failure in 
obtaining the construction permit form local 
government motivated them to the actions. Six 
restrictions were conducted by FPI and Forum 
Umat Islam (FUI), a new actor, which only 
was active in worship restrictions issue in 
Bogor, but not in Bekasi and Bandung. 
A striking example is the case of GKI 
Yasmin Bogor construction, as it has become a 
political issue and was under the wide media 
spotlight and attention by the international 
community. GKI Yasmin has fulfilled all 
requirements for the construction of a Church 
such as getting signatures of agreement from 
members of community living surrounding it. 
In 2008 the local government of Bogor, 
particularly the office of City Plan and Park 
froze the permit of worship building 
construction, without clear reasoning, but 
simply reviewing the permit. In fact, GKI had 
bought the land and had got a permit for 
construction. When GKI management staff 
reported the case to National Commission of 
Human Rights, the officer of City Plan and 
Park of Bogor local government argues that the 
freezing was simply to temporarily cool down 
the pressure from Muslim Activists Forum 
(FORKAMI) [29]. 
FORKAMI mobilized massive 
demonstration to reject the construction of the 
church located on Kyai Haji Abdullah Bin Nuh 
Street, a name taken from a late Muslim 
legendary leader. They argued, as agreed by 
Bogor Mayor Diani Budiarto, that “It would 
not be good to build a Church on a street 
which uses the name of a legendary Muslim 
leader," a senseless reason which defeats legal 
argument [30]. With this in mind, Bogor 
Mayor has made legal constraints in the 
building of worship place. The Ombudsman, 
which backed up the verdict of the Supreme 
Court, ordered the Bogor Mayor and West 
Java Governor Ahmad Heryawan to obey the 
verdict and asked Minister of Home Affairs to 
supervise its implementation. Yet, Bogor 
Mayor Budiarto persisted not to obey the 
Ombudsman recommendation but offered to 
relocate the construction, in which GKI 
Yasmin management rejected [31]. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
The negative interconnection between 
Muslims and Christians in Indonesia  has 
started since their first encounter with 
reciprocal threat perception becomes the 
dominant explanation. While Muslims accused 
Christians of continuing Christianization 
mission, Christians suspected Muslims 
community remains installed an agenda on 
establishing Islamic states. The negative 
perception between these two communities 
turned into worship restriction when Indonesia 
experienced political system transition into a 
more democratic country in the late 1990s. 
Ironically, the freedom of union, speech and 
expression coupled with the implementation of 
decentralization has become the central issue 
to explain such problem. The creation of 
Islamic socio-movements with radical 
ideology such as FPI, FUI, AGAP and GARIS 
on one hand and Christianization program 
conducted by Pentecostalism and Charismatic 
church denominations, on the other hand, has 
provoked the religious intolerance between the 
two communities. 
Also, with the delegation of authority 
from central to local government on the 
worship places establishment through joint 
decree No. 8 and 9/2006, religious intolerance 
becomes worship restriction that violates the 
freedom of religion, particularly in West Java 
province. Surprisingly, the perpetrators of the 
restriction include local government officers 
such as the head of sub-district, head of 
district, major and even governor, police unit 
for security and orders who share the majority 
of actors, followed by hardline Islamic groups 
and head of neighborhood. The involvement of 
government officers in the worship restriction 
is manifested in banning church activities 
and/or withdrawing the letter of permit for the 
church building’s construction, which leads to 
further destructive activities by Islamic 
hardliner groups. Severely, the government 
failed to provide protection, assistance, and 
facilitation for Christian congregations to 
practice their worship activities. Of the 
restricted churches, striking cases such as 
HKBP Filadelfia, Santa Clara Catholic Church 
and HKBP Manseng church in Bekasi, coupled 
with GKI Yasmin and Santo Johaness Baptista 
in Bogor, has been covered widely under 
media spotlights and received international 
concerns. 
There are four recommendations that can 
be delivered from this article. First, Indonesian 
central government needs to monitor the work 
of local governments and security apparatus in 
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maintaining and upholding the religious 
tolerance in their areas of authorities. 
Secondly, the central government also needs to 
encourage the role of Harmony Forum for 
Religious Communities or also known as 
Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) in 
helping the local government to uphold the 
religious tolerance and resolve any problem 
emerged from intra and inter-faiths tension 
and/or conflict. Thirdly, the government needs 
to monitor the enhancement of numbers of 
worship places by rationalizing the numbers of 
acknowledged religions’ adherents without 
limiting their religious freedom. Both central 
and local government, through Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, should make an arrangement 
of church denominations including their 
church building, especially for Christian 
communities to avoid negative perception both 
from other church’s denominations and other 
religion adherents. The last but not the least, an 
education for religious leaders to deliver the 
message of peace and tolerance towards their 
congregations as well as to respect other 
religion teachings is vital. Hence, the 
government, supported with FKUB (Forum of 
Inter-Religious Harmony), needs to encourage 
religious leaders to have a mutual 
understanding about other religions' values and 
traditions and to respect the differences, 
particularly between Muslim and Christian 
communities. 
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